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A B S T R AC T Learning and understanding are often differentiated and distinguished from each other in people's experience and thinking, but they are necessarily related to each other. This relationship is visible in examples of how individuals express what they mean by learning. Starting from an observed similarity of expression, an idea is presented about how understanding may be appropriately described for pedagogy. Several examples of conceptual learning are highlighted and characterized in terms of the learners' experiences of variation in critical dimensions of the learning task. However, systematic variation of the learners' task has seldom been a primary theme in research except in the particular domains of perceptual and motor skills. By reconsidering the ways in which what is learned differs when skill practice conditions are systematically varied leads to a reorientation of our interpretation of what it is that is learned. It seems that it is something about the variation experienced that is learned. The resulting understanding can then be seen as the space of experiential variation.
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This article seeks to set out a way of thinking about understanding that has important implications for the design of the experiences which are offered to university students. It largely follows the structure of a conversation between the two authors which began in Gothenburg in 1997. The first section following this introduction presents the observed similarity in the way in which the relationship between learning and understanding is expressed in a range of settings.
In the second section several examples of conceptual learning are highlighted and characterized in terms of the learners' experiences of variation in critical dimensions of a learning task. However, systematic variation of the different parameters of the learners' task has seldom been a primary theme in research into learning. An exception is in the particular domains of perceptual and motor skills. The third section presents some of the robust findings from that field of study.
In the fourth part, reconsidering the ways in which what is learned differ when skill practice conditions are systematically varied leads to a reorientation of our interpretation of what it is that is learned. We attempt to pull together the experiences we have had in thinking about variation in the experience of learning and its relationship to understanding. We are drawn to the conclusion that it is, above all, something about the variation that is learned. We propose that any resulting understanding can be seen as the 'space of experiential variation'. We conclude that if this idea is a good description of understanding, at a level of analysis that is useful for pedagogy in higher education, curriculum design and teaching should deliberately include greater practice of variation.
Learning and understanding
We begin by drawing attention to the differences and similarities in the ways people describe their understanding of learning. In the study of the meanings of learning and understanding, it is usually reported that university-level students regard 'understanding' as a fairly distinct category (see Marton et al., 1997) . Marton et al. (in press) found that Uruguayan students describe the sequence of learning as:
First, they explained that you understand that which you are supposed to learn. This act of understanding is light, instantaneous and effortless. Synonyms such as 'you accept it', 'you take it in' are used. The next step includes all the processes of working on that which you have grasped. Somehow you process it, you absorb it, you make it really yours. And the third step: you really understand it -now you have appropriated it for yourself.
Mügler and Landbeck (1994) report a similar clear-cut distinction between learning and understanding among students of the University of the South Pacific. The surprise is that, whilst there was the same pattern of three phases, with very similar meanings, the terms were transposed and expressed as:
So, whilst there seem to be categorical differences within the pattern,
when pooling results from different cultures the two phenomena (learning and understanding) become indistinguishable across the pattern of variation or in the way in which they are differently assembled.
In a recent study on views of learning among high-school students (12-18-years old) in Hong Kong, it was found that they, especially the younger ones, used the terms 'learning' and 'understanding' interchangeably to a striking extent. Additionally, there were variations in the way they completed two expressions about learning and understanding that they had introduced themselves. What was most intriguing was the symmetry among the seemingly different ways in which they completed the two expressions. Regardless of whether they were talking about 'when you have really learned something . . .' . . (Marton et al., 1997) The point we are trying to make is that even if individual students had differentiated learning and understanding as different phenomena, on the group level the same pattern of variation appears in relation to both. In that sense, the two are indistinguishable. It also seems reasonable to assume that what the high-schools students in Hong Kong referred to as 'that which you have understood' or 'that which you have really learned' is what, in other studies at university level, is represented by an outcome or product category in a three phase sequence of knowledge acquisition.
Committing oneself to this position has certain implications. First, understanding in this sense corresponds to what is learned. Second, it follows that understanding is not defined as the 'correct' understanding. It is defined as the understanding arrived at by the learner. Hence, there may be different understandings. Third, it also follows that understanding does not necessarily have the subjective nature of sudden illumination (Helmstad & Marton, 1992 The cultural differences in university students' expression of similar meanings outlined above, and the pattern of differences in the Hong Kong study, are taken as a motif in orchestrating our thinking for this article. Looking at evidence from very different research cultures, by varying our own perspectives, we are drawn to an idea about variation in experience we feel has profound pedagogical implications. This article presents that idea.
We Dimensions of variation from the learner's perspective Marton and Booth (1997) brought together 25 years of research on learning from the learner's perspective. Their view focuses on the problem of 'What is learned?' Learning is seen as a change in the learner's capability of experiencing something in the world. It seeks to step away from the duality of the person and the world to consider the active relationship between the person and the world. It amounts to becoming capable of discerning certain aspects of a phenomenon and being capable of holding them in focal awareness (attending to them) simultaneously. Discernment and simultaneity are thus key features of learning according to this view. For instance, one way of experiencing and understanding numbers involves being capable of discerning units, their sequential positions, their 'manyness', the whole they make up, parts and various part-whole relations; and being capable of holding all of this in focal awareness simultaneously. Now, discernment depends on variation and experience of it. Completely invariant features of the world are difficult -or impossible -to discover.
We would probably have no concept of sex, if there were only one! According to a generalized figure-ground view of human awareness, it is in a perpetual flux. Persons, things, features come to the fore, become figural, focused, thematized, whereas others recede into -or remain in -the ground. They are then tacit or taken for granted (see Gurwitsch, 1964) .
A practical example of this is in teaching basic science. One of the most researched difficulties students encounter has to do with grasping the idea of motion governed by Newton's first law: 'a body remains in its state of rest or uniform motion unless a force is applied to change it '. Ueno et al. (1990) appear to suggest that a fundamental difference between Newtonian and commonsensical (or Aristotelian) way of thinking about motion is that in the former, the perspective -the frame of reference -is discerned as a dimension of potential variation. In the latter, the ground -being at rest -is the taken for granted frame of reference. Thus, for any moving object a 'pushing force' has to be introduced to account for the fact that the object is in motion and not in its natural state -at rest. However, if we realize that we perceive the object as moving because we are not moving, and that there is an infinite number of possible perspectives from which the object can be seen, then we can account for uniform movement in a frictionless universe. We can 'see' it in terms of the relationship between the object and the observer's perspective (i.e. in terms of one particular frame of reference among all possible frames of reference). A corollary of this conjecture is that if we introduce variation in perspective (frame of reference) it should be easier for the learner to grasp the idea of Newtonian motion.
To examine this notion, Ueno et al. (1990) developed a computer simulation for students to experiment with. It showed the trajectory of a ball dropped from a flying plane. The plane and the falling ball could be observed from different frames of reference: from the ground, from another plane flying alongside the first one, from a plane flying in the opposite direction, and so on. Variations of physical perspective thus introduced, in ways that are not usually subject to variation, demonstrably improve students' understanding of basic notions of force and motion. A similar finding has been reported by Laurillard (1995) .
Variation in perspective in a metaphorical sense can also be shown to be crucial for learning and understanding. Marton and Wenestam (1988) found that in the course of repeated readings of a difficult philosophical text, only those readers who spontaneously engaged in varying the perspectives from which they read, perceived the underlying conceptual structure as meant by the author. In another study, secondary school students read Franz Kafka's famous parable Before the Law three times (Marton et al., 1992) . Four different forms of understanding the parable emerged, varying
in complexity and inclusiveness. Additionally, a number of the students spontaneously introduced variation in the meaning of key elements of the short story ('X could mean A or B or C, etc.') or variation in the chain of interpretation ('if we assume that Y is the case, then it follows that . . . on the other hand, if we assume Z, then . . .'). Only students, who introduced one of these two forms of variation, or both, developed the more complex and inclusive understandings.
Dimensions of variation in acquiring concepts and conceptual skills: the problem of 'what is learned'?
Introducing variation, by others or by the individual learner, in the above examples has to do with breaking what the phenomenologists call the 'natural attitude'. This is our habitual and tacit assumption that what we experience is reality as such (and not reality experienced in a particular way). Furthermore, we also assume that the reality we experience is the same reality as all the others experience. The natural attitude contradicts the idea of learning to experience something in the world differently. Because, if it is reality that we experience, why would we need to experience it differently? By introducing variation, the natural attitude may be broken by demonstrating that there are, after all, other ways of seeing things.
A particularly efficient way of breaking the natural attitude is by arranging for people to exchange and share each other's views. By doing so, they realize that there are diverse ways of viewing things. Letting students be confronted with each other's views is a most powerful pedagogical tool (see, for example, Lybeck, 1981). Again, by inviting children to talk about their ways of learning, they become aware of the fact that they have a way of learning, and that there are other, sometimes better, ways of learning. Pramling (1990) introduced variation, and brought about reflection, among pre-school children on three different levels. These were: the level of content (e.g. the use of symbols), the level of structure (e.g. the rain circle) and the level of meta-cognition (e.g. ways of learning). After a teaching experiment lasting for a year, children from the experimental schools developed demonstrably dramatically better capabilities for learning from new experiences compared with control groups.
Ahlberg (1992) introduced variation in several dimensions in a study focusing on problem solving in mathematics with 9-year-olds. First, there was a variation in the kind of problems the children worked with, ranging across problems with no mathematical content at all, problems that the children had to invent, problems without unique solutions, and quite regular word problems. Another dimension of variation concerned the skills they could draw on in the solution process: reading, writing, story telling, drawing and computing. Third, in a way reminiscent of Pramling's
study, the children worked in groups and chose from alternative solutions to present to the class, thus revealing and reflecting over the variation in the act and the content of working with the problems. By the end of the term in which the study was conducted, the children had become better problem-solvers and did significantly better on novel problems of the conventional type than children in a control group.
Following a similar approach J. A. Fazey and Parker (2001) used a similar combination of variation with final year undergraduate students in sport, health and physical education sciences at Bangor. The dimensions selected for variation and repeated practice included the background content (students did not all receive the same source material), academic problems to solve, argue over and present, skills to use (mind-mapping, drafting, and redrafting short, focused papers and reviewing peer drafts in groups). The module provided opportunities for 'learning to learn' in very explicit ways. An example of the effect on learners of the variation experienced is highlighted by the following comments in response to a question about how their own learning was changing as the class progressed:
. . . the peer feedback helped but not as much as being able to read the other peoples' drafts . . . This, in turn, links to a comment in a follow-up interview with a student who reported early confusion with the content and the methodology. The comment indicates a profound change in attitude and approach to studying that might be characterized as a shift from an intention and an attempt to simply 'store the facts' to one which may not be rewarded in a traditional assessment framework; that is, to understand in a meaningful way.
The practice and variation factors are the most powerful messages that come out of the area being studied in the class. In motor learning everyone recognizes that practice is important. Over one semester students went through four cycles of practice in preparation for the assessment of their understanding of the area. Practice does not mean mere repetition. It means to create, invent, adapt and progress, in the light of previous experience. In the light of their own experience, students in the class recognized and reported the influence that the practice variations introduced as learning support had on their motivation to learn, their expectation of success, the sense of value placed on their learning and their sense of mastery of the
content. One of the most interesting findings was that, among a sample of the students interviewed in depth after the module, all those who reported that they had engaged with the practices achieved higher grades in all their subsequent modules than they had done in other courses (Parker, in review). The extent to which this relied on variation of experience interacting with the amount of practice would be impossible to disentangle.
In the next section, we discuss variation of experience in the research tradition studied by the students just mentioned. It is quite different from the above and comes from the search for theoretical frameworks for understanding human motor behaviour and learning. In the context of this discussion it conveniently provides examples of the outcomes of systematic variation in learners' experiences and practice. It offers a different perspective, at a different level of analysis but underlines the common theme of the importance of variation in learning experiences.
The systematic variation of practising motor skills
In motor skill research, a learner's experience is structured as practice. Arising from hypothesized information processing models of underlying control processes, research questions have been formulated about how subsequent performance differences might be promoted by varying practice conditions and regimes. The actual outcomes of such experiments are sufficiently robust that they are frequently replicated to help students of physical education and sport sciences gain an understanding of methods of enquiry, underpinning principles and the key conceptual and practical issues in their field. In the strictest sense there is no justification for generalizing the findings outside the motor field but they have been successfully translated into guidelines for shaping a major part of an undergraduate curriculum which has gained some recognition for its innovatory approach (Fazey and Fazey, 1995) . Variation in practice of being an increasingly skilful learner is at its core.
The variability of practice hypothesis in motor learning
The impact of practice on skilled performance has a long pedigree. For the most part, there is a common sense view that if you want to do something well you practise it until you are satisfied that you can do it, at will, to the standard required. That view was to a large part reflected in training practices and largely supported by research until about 25 years ago. However, skilful performance is also exemplified by adaptability and the effortless accommodation of the seemingly unpredictable. To cope with that adaptability Schmidt (1975) proposed a theoretical model for motor skill acquisition that used an abstract, schematic memory as an underlying mental
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construct that purported to support flexible performance of motor skills. He referred to the schema idea in Bartlett's (1932) treatment of remembering to develop a functional model that provided a powerful heuristic tool for the study of transfer effects in motor learning. The model suggested some clearly testable hypotheses. Not least of these was that varying selected dimensions of the practice conditions would enhance the retention and transferability of what is practised. Early experiments to manipulate variability of practice failed to generate any convincing evidence that it could enhance transfer. However, in a presentation to the North American Sport Psychology Association entitled 'Schema: it depends where you look', Moxley and Fazey (1977) reported the results of several small experiments that presented adult learners with very unfamiliar tasks. The experiment manipulated dimensions of the practice conditions which could be varied systematically to stress that unfamiliarity. The results showed an effect which has been replicated by numerous studies using the paradigm. The observable outcome of well-controlled studies is always the same. Individuals who experience high variability in practice conditions always perform less well at the end of the practice period than those who practise on one variation of the task. The rather counterintuitive finding is that in transferring to a condition or variation which is novel those who experienced varied practice conditions perform better.
The experimental design borrowed heavily from some earlier studies in how learners come to be able to recognize prototype images and or new variations of classes of images (Attneave, 1957; Posner and Keele, 1968) . It relies on arranging experience of stochastic variations with uniformity in the differences between them. This allows balanced presentations of different practice schedules. It ensures that each individual in a 'constant' practice group has only experienced one variation, whereas in a 'varied' practice group every learner has practised all possible practice variations. It also ensures that for every group the pooled exposure to varied conditions and the amount of practice are the same. All subjects can then be tested on a criterion variation that none have actually experienced.
Attneave (1957) was investigating the extent to which our ability to recognize things might be reliant on particular features of or the ways in which images were presented. Posner and Keele (1968, 1970) used more distorted dot patterns to support their contention that it is during the period of exposure to variations in an acquisition phase, rather than in a recall or recognition phase, that some common element or abstract idea is formed. Franks and Bransford (1971) extended the empirical data showing similar effects in learning to recognize related two-dimensional figures. Reed (1972) and Neumann (1977) 
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work in the area that has formed the basis of much of the later work in artificial intelligence applications developing learning programmes and recognition software. Less well-known developments led to Welker's (1982) work on the ability of subjects to abstract musical themes from melodic variations. What was not developed was an approach that went beyond recognition and expected subjects to be able to recreate, in a new form, a variation that could be considered to be derived from the abstraction that had to be recognized. The design did not investigate fully the potential for transfer in terms of understanding that is represented by being able to do something new. However, such studies represent formal demonstrations of a principle of tolerance of variation which is fundamental in developing expertise. Moxley (1979) refined the transfer design to test the variability of practice hypothesis with young children throwing an unfamiliar object at targets on the floor. All the target locations were spaced at regular intervals on the arc of a circle. The subjects sat with their feet towards a fixed point in the room. This meant that the throwing action from each location was different. The 'unfamiliar projectile' was a badminton shuttle. The results were dramatic in supporting the idea of variation as a key to transfer and retention. Numerous investigators obtained support for the 'variability of practice hypothesis' as Moxley (1979) had called it (e.g. Carson and Wiegand, 1979; Kelso and Norman, 1978; Wulf and Schmidt, 1988) . In all such examples subjects who experience variation in their practice conditions are generally more accurate and consistent in both the retention tests and transfer test trials to a new target. It has to be recognized that, at the end of practice periods, learners in varied practice conditions are never performing as well as learners in the less varied conditions. Kerr and Booth's (1977) results were no exception, but what is remarkable is that they also showed that, after a retention interval, children who experienced practice variations scored better on a transfer test target than children who had practised only on the actual test target! A quite surprising and counterintuitive finding.
The early general conclusions for motor learning
There is a good argument that to be skilful means that predictions about the environment are accurate within the tolerance levels that concurrently apply. Once the environment becomes predictable, the performer operates as if the task is simple. It is something to do with understanding and being aware of the limits of tolerance that apply in the variations that come with each context. Some differences do not make a difference in how the performer needs to act. The progress from beginner to expert, from novice to skilled performer, involves a progression in accurately anticipating when
and what will happen and matching that to appropriately selected actions. Such progress can be expressed, from the learner's point of view, as the change from something being difficult to it becoming easy. When it is easy, it is understood or when it is understood, it is easy.
Understanding in this physical sense is also a double-edged sword. Jagacinsky et al. (1977) made the point that skill is not just about understanding how to reorganize a movement to fit environmental variation. It is also often about reorganizing the relationship with the environment (e.g. getting to the right start position) to allow a well-practised movement to be used. They showed that being able to reorganize the context or conditions is facilitated by varied practice.
Criticism of the underlying constructs of schema theories led to a decline in its popularity as a potential explanation of the underlying mechanisms of skill acquisition and enhancement. Investigators moved to examining alternative frameworks designed to consider the impact in variation in the scheduling of practice of completely different physical and mental tasks to create what is referred to as contextual interference (c.f. Battig, 1966; Lee and Magill, 1983) . The underlying principle exposed in such experiments is that frequent change in task demands leads to greater retention and an increased facility for operating outside the conditions practised. Irrespective of the differences in the constructs used to discuss the underlying cognitive processes, the common finding is that variation of tasks or contexts stimulates different and, in measurable performance, better learning outcomes.
Dimensions of variation in acquiring physical skills and the problem of 'what is learned'
What comes out of these examples for us is not simply that varying practice conditions can have positive, longer term effects for learners, but also that there are several dimensions along which practice conditions might vary. Some of these are embedded in the previous experience of the learner, some in the physical structure of the task, and some in the way learners are exposed to variations in practice. Fortunately, irrespective of what is being varied, it does seem that, as the experience of variation is increased from trial to trial, so is the effectiveness of that practice in terms of long-term retention and transfer.
The studies of motor skill learning were designed as studies of transfer in relation to varied practice, but they raise a fundamental question rather than giving us an answer. How can you become capable of doing one thing by means of having learnt something else? Our answer to this question is simple and straightforward: 'You can't!' When it comes to understanding the relationship between what happened in practice and what is done in
another situation, we would be better off if we knew what learners had learned, what had changed, rather than offering an explanation in terms of transfer. Our suggestion is that the solution lies in the fact that what you learn is different from what it seems to be. We suggest that in a real sense it is variation itself that is learned.
Concluding coalescences
With the aim of illuminating the nature of understanding, we have discussed briefly some seemingly very different sets of studies. There are paradigmatic differences. They concern the assumptions -theoretical and methodological -built into the studies. And there are apparently substantive differences. They concern the different kinds of learning investigated. In spite of these differences, we want to argue that each set of studies can be reinterpreted in light of the other. Furthermore, we claim that the different kinds of learning are interrelated and that they are relevant to questions about the nature of understanding.
The motor learning studies lend support to the thesis that varied practice enhances retention and transfer more than less varied practice. The results can be made sense of in terms of the view of learning implied in the earlier section, namely, learning as a change in the way in which the learner is capable of being aware of something.
So, for instance, when throwing a badminton shuttle, if you keep practising from a constant location and in relation to an invariant target then you learn to throw in a certain direction at a certain distance and you cannot be expected to perform well in other circumstances. If direction, distance and form vary, you learn how to throw the shuttle to any target point. Experience of variation in distances constitutes a field that includes distances that have never been used. It is the same with direction or form. You learn distance through experiencing variation in distance and you learn direction through experiencing variation in direction. If the two dimensions of variation are not related in the learner's experience, they are distinguished from each other -and from other features of the act of throwing. With constant distance and direction, the different aspects of throwing are not discerned from each other. More difficult to grasp is the idea that the size of the field is not constrained by the limits of past experience. If it is the variation that is understood then the field accommodates more than can be accounted for than by just examining past experience.
Every application of what has been learned previously is a new experience that can be characterized in terms of critical dimensions of variation through the simultaneous awareness of the present and the past (Marton, 1998).
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We could think of variation in more than one dimension, of course. We could have introduced simultaneous variation in other dimensions, such as distance, weight of the shuttle, and so on. Under these varied conditions, learners would presumably discern the different aspects and become capable of holding them in focal awareness simultaneously. Compared with unvaried conditions, it would probably give a most substantial further advantage in a transfer condition with new location, new distance and new weight. These are in fact the very outcomes in the experiments that systematically varied such dimensions. Schmidt's (1975) theory is -as was pointed out -a schema theory. It posits that motor learning does not take place by filling a storehouse with traces of specific movements. As with precursor studies in perception, it was hypothesized that a generalized schema is abstracted. When the person encounters a situation that is novel in some respect, the schema gets adjusted. It changes, becomes more general, and hence it gains strength. The theoretical model was, however, tied to the idea of a complex of invariant features of a class of movements -a generalizable, motor programme. That idea has become somewhat redundant as the motor control and learning field has embraced new concepts that have moved away from the idea of movement with invariant features represented centrally. Current wisdom more often builds on the recognition of the lawful behaviour of the physical structures of the body and recruits dynamical systems theory to offer an explanation of skilful control. The experimental data remain to be interpreted, however. In our interpretation, we are focusing on the sensitivity to the variable features of the movement, and the notion of a dynamic relationship between the person and the world. Of course, we could be accused of avoiding the very issue that the schema was supposed, but fails, to resolve. How does the schema (or whatever), dormant in longterm memory, become activated? In order to establish a particular movement as belonging to the domain of the schema, it has to be interpreted as such by the very schema that has to be activated as a result of the interpretation. The schema thus must call upon itself. Using it presupposes that it is already being used. The resolution of that debate requires an even more dynamic framework for controlling skilled, voluntary physical and mental acts.
Dynamics of awareness
Instead of adopting a mentalistic perspective, we are looking at learning as a change in the person-world relationship. The person becomes capable of discerning a particular aspect (or several correlated aspects) and sensitivity to that aspect develops, or the aspect becomes a critical feature of the learner's world. So, we could say that the relationship has changed, or that
the person has changed or even that the world has changed. In throwing a ball, for instance, distance, ball weight, ball size, air movement, and so on, are all discernible and discerned, thanks to our previous -and in these and other respects -varied experiences. What the person can then do (or say, or imagine) in a relationship with the world has also changed in some way that is intimately linked to the variation in those experiences.
This relational view of learning -the emphasis on the one-ness of person and world -implies that we are not aiming at describing what is taking place in terms of the interplay of any underlying mental machinery. We aim at describing the nature and dynamics of awareness -the subject-object relation is our unit. Awareness should not be understood in mentalistic terms. There are different layers of awareness and the characteristic of its nature and dynamics suggested by Marton and Booth (1997) is neutral to such conventional distinctions as those between mental and bodily experience or between experiences through different modalities. Descriptions of our differing experiences are presented on a higher level, in terms of the structure and meaning of that which is experienced.
Our point is that this is a sufficient and possibly optimal level of description in relation to certain pedagogical aims (such as bringing about understanding, for instance). This means that, instead of describing an educational environment and the person's mind separately (in which the former is supposed to affect that latter) we are describing this environment as experienced by the learner -or the learners. We are trying to understand what is taking place in terms of the dynamics of the experiential field (awareness) of a single individual or of the dynamics of shared experiential fields (a kind of collective consciousness). At that level of analysis, and within such a framework, experiences which are commonly seen as conceptual (cognitive) and those which are commonly seen as physical (somatic) may appear logically different and separable, but are probably not functionally separable. They are correlated, in that they are intertwined, and they are important dimensions of variation of the learner's experience, awareness and understanding.
Space of experiential variation
We have presented good grounds for the claim that learning and understanding can be more or less differentiated in people's experience and thinking, but they are always related to each other. It seems reasonable to us to deal with understanding in terms of what is learned and we accept that this is manifested in what people can say, can do or can tell. We view the qualitatively different ways in which we experience or make sense of something as the critical aspects of what is learned. These are qualitatively A certain understanding of a phenomenon can be characterized in terms of the aspects that are discerned and held simultaneously in focal awareness. Every aspect is a dimension of variation; it is born of the experience of variation and it enables the person to deal with subsequent novelty and variation. The different aspects discerned and focused upon constitute an 'outcome space' of variation (see Marton and Booth, 1997) . We want thus to suggest that it is exactly the space of variation that is an understanding. This is basically what we learn, and it is what we rely on when dealing with novel situations.
Our conviction is that this is a useful way of conceptualizing learning and understanding. In recognizing variation as a common factor that emerges from a wide range of research, at different levels of analysis, at different stages in the education system, we are also drawn to the idea that effective teaching will emphasize and recruit opportunities to encourage variation. Encouraging our students to practise varying their perspectives, approaches, and the skills they employ, is based on the variations that we have each experienced, benefited from and recognized in each other's work.
The sense we are beginning to make of our separate and very different research backgrounds is that understanding, the person-world relationship, is a space established, but not delimited by, the dimensions of variation experienced by the learner. In other words, understanding is the space of experiential variation.
Notes
1. The main idea in this article arose from a conversation between the authors in Gothenburg in 1997. It could not have been arrived at individually. As such it should be jointly attributed. 2. Helmstad (in progress) has found that children 10-15 years old often do not differentiate between 'learning' and 'understanding', even when the latter is supposed to refer to a sudden insight.
